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I. INTRODUCTION
Professional malpractice litigation is a special category of general litigation
which calls for its own unique set of procedures and abilities. Counsel for plaintiff
or defendant must be a highly-skilled litigator aware of the practices and proce-
dures unique to professional malpractice litigation. Often the defendant carries
specific errors and omissions insurance targeted to protect against liability for his
or her professional negligence. It frequently develops, in certain kinds of profes-
sional malpractice litigation, that multiple parties are named as defendants.
* Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable re-
search assistance of Linda A. Mosby, Esq.
© Copyright 1992 Francis M. Hanna.
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Whether called upon to represent a single defendant or multiple defendants, the at-
torney retained by the insurance carrier to defend against the alleged malpractice
may be confronted with troublesome professional challenges. This article will fo-
cus on some of the exposures common to defense counsel selected by the insurer to
represent insured professionals who are named as defendants in a professional
malpractice complaint.1
A common provision in liability insurance policies gives the insurer the exclu-
sive control over litigation covered by the policy, even though the insurer is obli-
gated to defend the insured against all covered claims. 2 The contractual
commitment to provide defense for the insured is an important financial benefit
granted by the insurance, second only to coverage for exposure to liability for pro-
fessional errors or omissions. In exchange for the premiums, the insurer promises
not only liability coverage, but competent legal defense by counsel retained by the
carrier. However, like any mutually beneficial business arrangement, the symbi-
otic relationship of insurer-insured is not without its conflicts, and in this drama,
there is a third actor drawn inexorably into the fray: the parties' common lawyer.
The most obvious concerns for insurance defense counsel are those of divided
loyalties, duties of confidentiality, and impairment of the lawyer's independent
professional judgment.' The retention of defense counsel pursuant to an insurance
contract may also present other latent conflicts of interest,' the growing judicial
recognition of which is developing into an entire new body of law unique to insur-
ance defense.'
The "marked increase in the number of reported legal malpractice suits con-
cerning the performance of attorneys in the area of insurance law"' indicates that
1. The focus will be narrowed to three categories of parties: the primary insurer, the insured (who may be
more than one individual) and the attorney retained to represent the interests of these parties in insurance de-
fense. The subjects of co-insurance, subrogation, and other insurance companies are outside the scope of this
article.
2. Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Duty of Insurer to Pay for Independent Counsel When Conflict of Interest Ex-
ists Between Insured and Insurer, 50 A.L.R.4TH 932, 937 (1986) (citing 44 Am. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1405
(1982)) [hereinafter Smyth].
3. Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed
Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REv. 211, 225 (1982).
The actual or potential conflicts which exist at the inception of the lawsuit may be the easier to recognize.
Potential conflicts of interest may arise in any of the following five circumstances: (1) there is a question
as to whether the policy was in force at the time of the accident; (2) not all of the counts of the complaint
are covered by the policy; (3) the policy might or might not apply, depending on the facts of the occur-
rence; (4) the complaint seeks an amount in excess of the policy; and (5) the policy covers multiple de-
fendants whose interests may or may not be in conflict.
Lloyd C. Williams, Jr. & Donald V. Jernberg, Conflicts of Interest in Insurance Defense Litigation: Common Sense
in Changing Times, 31 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 111, 112 (1981) [hereinafter Williams & Jernberg].
4. Lieberman v. Employer's Ins. of Wausau, 419 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1980).
5. Richard H. Underwood, The Doctor and His Lawyer: Conflicts of Interest, 30 KAN. L. REv. 385, 386
(1982) [hereinafter Underwood]. Many of the articles on conflicts of interest for insurance defense counsel are
collected at Paul J. Triesch, Note, Insurance Law: Reservation of Rights, 23 GONZ. L. REv. 205, 206-07 n. 10
(1987-88) [hereinafter Triesch]. See also 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §
21.3, at 359 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter Mallen & Smith].
6.2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.1, at 359. "Most malpractice claims are brought against insurance
defense counsel, increasingly against coverage counsel, and occasionally against subrogation counsel." Id. at
360.
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the risks for defense counsel who fail to recognize and deal with these problems
may include liability for legal malpractice, a default judgment ordered against the
insured, loss of the insurer's otherwise valid policy defenses,7 malpractice liability
to the carrier, excess uninsured liability for the insurer,8 and other civil and ethical
sanctions.9 The insurance defense attorney who fails to recognize, or improperly
handles, a conflict of interests between the insurer and insured exposes the insurer
to liability for the attorney's own negligence or breach of fiduciary duties. 0
The objective of this article is to categorize and analyze some of these risks to
facilitate prophylactic and curative awareness and procedures.
II. INSURANCE DEFENSE COUNSEL:
THE APEX OF A LOVERS' TRIANGLE
Arising out of the attorney-client relationship rather than the insurance con-
tract, the duty of the attorney retained by an insurance company to defend the in-
sured is to advise both clients with the skill and care required of a reasonable
attorney under the circumstances." Although the existence and extent of the duty
depend upon the circumstances which create the relationship, the primary focus in
the legal malpractice suit against the former defense counsel is on how far the at-
torney's duty extends to both clients.12 The extent of the attorney's duty will ordi-
narily be set by the nature of the undertaking and the subject-matter of the
representation, but also may be limited by agreement among the parties. 13
7. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1967); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 149
N.E.2d 482 (Ill. App. 2d 1958) (where the insured lied about being the driver of his vehicle, his attorneys de-
posed him to gather information to assist the insurer in denying coverage, and the court held that the insurer
waived the policy defense of lack of cooperation by failing promptly to disclaim liability and using the attorneys'
fiduciary relationship with the insured against him). Id. at 483-87. The attorneys failed to notify the insured of
the possible conflict and terminate their representation. Id. at 486; Van Dyke v. White, 349 P.2d 430 (Wash.
1960); Accord Parsons v. Continental Nat'l. Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94, 97 (Ariz. 1976) (citing ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 949 (1966)).
8. Royal Crown Cola Bottling Co. v. AetnaCasualty & Sur. Co., 438 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Smiley
v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 375 N.E.2d 118 (111. 1978).
9. Smyth, supra note 2, at 938 (noting that the attorney may be disqualified, either by his or her own disqual-
ification or imputed disqualification, and/or may be censured, suspended or disbarred depending upon the nat-
ure and extent of the ethical considerations); see also John W. Dondanville, Defense Counsel Beware: The Perils of
Conflicts ofInterest, 1982 TUAL LAW. GuiuE 408 [hereinafter Dondanville]; Kelly v. Greason, 244 N.E.2d 456
(N.Y. 1968); 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.12, at 393 (noting that the loss of a valuable client can be an
unexpected consequence of mishandled conflicts).
10. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988), where the court stated:
We have no difficulty in holding that where an insurance carrier has employed the defense counsel, who
faced with a conflict of interest between the insured and the carrier, breaches his fiduciary duty to the
insured by favoring the carrier, the carrier is legally liable along with the attorney for any ensuing damage
to the insured.
Id. at 268 (citations omitted).
11. Underwood, supra note 5, at 388.
12. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 8.2, at 404.
13. Id. at 407-08; Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physician's Professional Liab. Trust, 570 So. 2d
1362, 1368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (applying the same parameters for the insurer/insured fiduciary relation-
ship).
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Although the tripartite relationship created by insurance defense usually re-
volves around rights and obligations addressed in the insurance contract, 14 it nev-
ertheless reduces itself to dual representation by an attorney whose obligation is to
further the interests of both the insured and the insurer:
In the insured-insurer relationship, the attorney characteristically is engaged and
paid by carrier to defend the insured. The insured and insurer have certain obliga-
tions each to the other, as previously noted, arising from the insurance contract.
Both the insured and the carrier have a common interest in defeating or settling the
third party's claim. If the matter reaches litigation, the attorney appears of record for
the insured and at all times represents him in terms measured by the extent of his
employment.
In such a situation, the attorney has 2 clients whose primary, overlapping and
common interest is the speedy and successful resolution of the claim and litigation.
Conceptually, each member of the trio, attorney, client-insured, and client-insurer,
has corresponding rights and obligations founded largely on contract, and as to the
attorney, by the Rules of Professional Conduct as well. The three parties may be
viewed as a loose partnership, coalition or alliance directed toward a common goal,
sharing a common purpose which lasts during pendency of the claim or litigation
against the insured.15
An obvious problem with this so-called "lover's triangle" 6 is the nature of the
attorney's relationship with the individual parties. Often contractual and expressly
negotiated, the attorney's normally ongoing relationship with the insurer is usu-
ally supported by strong financial interests. 7 Indeed, he or she may be a salaried
employee of the insurer totally financially dependent on this one client. 8 By sharp
contrast, the relationship with the insured professional, usually limited to the de-
fense of a specific case, may be transitory and narrow. 9
Thus, the tripartite relationship is conceived and born into an environment of
potential conflict for the attorney by virtue of the very nature of the duality of in-
terests of not only the clients, themselves, but of their common lawyer. This fact
can cast a pall of actual or potential discord over the entire representation from the
outset. Indeed, most malpractice claims filed against insurance defense counsel
"concern errors attributable to the failure of the attorney to fulfill fiduciary obliga-
14. Eric M. Holmes, A Conflicts of Interest Roadmap for Insurance Defense Counsel: Walking an Ethical Tight-
rope Without a Net, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 2 (1989).
15. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court for Sacramento County, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561, 571 (Ct.
App. 1974).
16. Williams & Jernberg, supra note 3, at 111.
17. "The court may not close its eyes to the obvious. The prime interest of these [insurance defense] attorneys
is the insurance company, in whose behalf they defend many cases year after year . . . . "Schwartz v. Sar Corp.,
195 N.Y.S.2d 496, 563 (Sup. Ct. 1959). Defense counsel's long-standing relationship with the insurer, and the
inevitable impact which it had on the handling of the case, was noted in Cozzens v. Bazzani Bldg. Co., 456 F.
Supp. 192, 193 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
18. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.7, at 377-81 (discussing in-house counsel); see also In re
Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1987) (evaluating both sides of the question regarding the propriety of
allowing the insurer to select in-house counsel for the defense).
19.2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.3, at 365.
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tions. The tripartite relationship created by an insurance contract portends the
risks of such claims by the insured, the insurer or both."2"
The situation is not helped by the fact that the usual insurance contract gives the
stronger of the clients, the insurer, the control over the defense of the lawsuit.
21
Recognized by the courts as customary and proper, this contractual provision has
been cited as authority for concluding that the very purchase of a liability policy
which authorizes the insurer to select the defense counsel is, itself, consent by the
insured to the dual representation.22
However, consent to dual representation is by no means tantamount to a waiver
of actual conflicts of interest or a carte blanche release from the attorney's fiduci-
ary duty of confidentiality to the insured. Indeed, the attorney's duties to the in-
sured are in no way diminished by the fact that the insurer employed him, and the
attorney owes to the insured the same obligation of good faith and fidelity as if he
had been personally employed by the insured.23
Regardless of whether the attorney is selected by the insured or the insurer, the
duties are owed directly to the insured .24 Contractual provisions which vest exclu-
sive control of the defense in the insurer run counter to the policy considerations
invoked by the attorney-client relationship with the insured and may offer fertile
grounds for conflicts of interests and the need for independent counsel .2' Thus,
even though the insured expressly or tacitly assents to dual representation, grant-
ing to the insurer the authority to retain defense counsel and control the defense of
the lawsuit, and even in some instances to settle the lawsuit without the insured's
consent, the attorney still owes all of the duties of loyalty, competency, confiden-
tiality, and zeal to the insured as much as if he were both retained and paid by him.
It is the responsibility of the attorney to be alert to conflicts between his clients
and advise both parties of their actual or potential existence.26 Once a conflict has
arisen, it may be permissible in mostjurisdictions for counsel to continue to repre-
sent both parties with their informed consent, recognizing however the exposure
20. Id. § 23.1, at 360.
21. See Arthur P. Berg, Losing Control of the Defense - The lnsured's Right to Select His Own Counsel, FOR
THE DEF., July 1984, at 10 (discussing some of the complications of the insurer's losing its contractual right of
control).
22. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.3, at 365.
23. Id.; see also L.C. Di Stasi, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Representation of Conflicting Interests Sub-
jecting Attorney to Disciplinary Action, 17 A.L.R.3o 835, 84849 (1968) (citing disciplinary cases applying the
standard that an attorney owes to the insured the same obligation as if he had been personally employed by the
insured).
24. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 268 (Miss. 1988); Triesch, supra note 5, at
209. As noted by John W. Dondanville, Defense Counsel Beware: The Perils of Conlficts of Interest Revisited 29
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 249 (1985):
The area of professional responsibility and the ethical considerations in the representation of an insured is
undergoing serious scrutiny by the courts. An attorney would do well to recall that, if he is hired to defend
an insured, the court views the insured as his client, and he must, therefore, defend the insured vigorously
and with all good faith.
Id. at 260.
25. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 250.
26. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.14, at 396-99.
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to liability for any resulting harm and the possibility of a charge of professional
misconduct.27 The insurer may offer, and the insured may accept, defense under a
reservation of rights, creating a conflict of interest, which in many jurisdictions
waives the insurer's policy defenses. "However, it has been stated that even if the
insured accepts a conditional defense under a reservation of rights, the ethical di-
lemma is not always avoided."28
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
MAJOR AREAS OF EXPOSURE
Ordinarily, the interests of the insurer and the insured are harmonious and there is
no conflict in one attorney representing both parties. Since he is able to exercise his
independent judgment for both clients, there is nothing improper or unethical about
representing the interests of both. However, situations can arise where those inter-
ests may become conflicting. When such a conflict does arise, serious ethical con-
siderations may prohibit an attorney from continuing to represent both the interests
of the insurer and the insured.29
It has been held that the attorney's sole duty of loyalty is owed to the insured
rather than the insurer and when the interests of the two differ, the attorney's ethi-
cal obligation is to pursue the interests of the insured.3" Any provisions of the em-
ployment contract between the attorney and the insurer which interfere with the
attorney's duties to the insured would be unenforceable as against public policy.
31
27. Smyth, supra note 2, at 939 (citing Thornton v. Paul, 384 N.E.2d 335 (II1. 1978)); see also Williams &
Jernberg, supra note 3, at 122; W. R. Habeeb, Annotation, Malpractice: Liability of Attorney Representing Con-
flicting Interests, 28 A.L.R.3D 389 (1969):
However, there are situations in which a conflict of interest may arise between insurer and insured repre-
sented by the same attorney. If such a conflict does exist, the attorney can continue to represent both cli-
ents only after full disclosure and full consent; and if he fails to make such full disclosure, he will be held
liable in a malpractice action.
Id. at 396.
28. Smyth, supra note 2, at 939; see also Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. East Cent. Alabama Ford-Mer-
cury Inc., 574 So. 2d 716 (Ala. 1990); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 715 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1968)
(involving the attorney's enhanced obligation when the insurance company is defending under reservation of
rights).
29. Henry B. Alsobrook, Jr., Conflicts Between The InsurerAnd Insured, 48 INs. COUNS. J. 165, 166 (1981)
(where the author earlier noted that conflicts are "the exception rather than the rule," but that there is a growing
tendency "for courts to look more carefully at the relationship of the defense counsel to the insured").
30. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 448 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
The courts consistently have stated that the defense counsel owes the same unqualified loyalty to the in-
sured as if he had been personally retained by the insured. In fact, several courts have maintained that the
loyalty to the insured may even be paramount because the defense of the insured is the sole basis for the
employment.
Jason A. Reschly, Attorney Malpractice - Wrongful Settlement by the Insured's and Insurer' Joint Defense Attorney,
45 Mo. L. REv. 739, 743-44 (1980) (citations omitted).
31. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988); Bell, 448 N.W.2d at 806.
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A. Information Harmful to One Client
but Beneficial to the Other
John W. Dondanville has posited several of the typical situations which can give
rise to actual conflicts of interests for insurance defense counsel.32 The first of
these involves the discovery of facts which may either take the insured's claim out-
side the policy's coverage (e.g., an intentional malicious act) or provide a defense
to coverage for the insurer (e.g., collusion with the plaintiff)." Upon learning this
information, the attorney is immediately confronted with the issue of what to do.
The attorney must decide whether he or she should withdraw, and how to evaluate
and handle the insurer's contractual obligation to provide the insured's defense.34
Citing an Illinois case,3" Dondanville notes that it stated the general rule that an
insurer asserting that a claim is outside the policy coverage still has a duty to de-
fend under a reservation of rights or seek a declaratory judgment. An insurer who
fails to do this is estopped from later raising its policy defense."
The court in that case found that even though there was a conflict of interest, the
insurance company correctly refused to defend. Thus, the insurance company was
free to use the information gained from the attorney in maintaining that defense.37
B. Counts in the Complaint
Not Covered by the Policy
Another common situation of conflict for insurance defense counsel involves a
petition with multiple counts, only some of which are covered by the insurance
policy.
It is not uncommon for a claimant to assert multiple causes of action against an in-
sured, with only some of the causes giving rise to coverage under the policy. A com-
plaint alleging multiple causes of action, some of which arise out of conduct covered
by the insurance policy and some of which do not, does not create a conflict of inter-
est between the insured and the carrier so long as the issue is whether the insured is
liable, not why the insured is liable. It is when defense counsel undertakes the ques-
tion of coverage that problems occur.3"
Doubts regarding coverage create a conflict which pits the interests of the in-
sured (liability, if at all, under an insured count) against those of the insurer whose
concerns are defending only those counts covered by the policy.39 As noted by
Dondanville, "such a conflict of interest precludes insurer's attorney from repre-
32. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 250-54; see also Dondanville, supra note 9, at 409-13.
33. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 250.
34. Id.
35. Murphy v. Urso, 430 N.E.2d 1079 (Ill. 1981).
36. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 251.
37. Murphy, 430 N.E.2d at 1084.
38. Triesch, supra note 5, at 215 (citations omitted).
39. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.16, at 401; see also John J. Bianchesi, Coverage Disputes With the
Insured; The Insurer's Perspective, 48 INs. CouNs. J. 153 (1981); Thomas J. Weithers, The Coverage Role Of De-
fense Counsel, 48 INs. COUNS. J. 156 (1981).
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senting insured."4" This situation at the very least calls for independent counsel to
represent the insured,41 and attempting to defend under a reservation of rights by
the insurer is generally not acceptable.42 Under such situations, "[t]he courts have
almost uniformly concluded that the existence of such a conflict obligates the in-
surer to assume the cost of retaining independent counsel for the insured.
C. Offers to Settle Within
the Policy Limits
The well-known case of Lysick v. Walcom" involved another common exposure
to the attorney seeking to defend an insured: an offer to settle within the policy lim-
its that is rejected by the insurer.4" Because it guarantees coverage for his or her
entire liability, the insured has a greater interest in such an offer than an insurer
who, rejecting the offer, may be successful in denying liability if the matter is
taken to trial.' This conflict is exacerbated by the possibility of ajudgment which
exceeds the policy limits, thereby exposing the insured's personal assets to attach-
ment for the excess.
The attorney in Lysick was held liable for failing to communicate the settlement
negotiations to the insured and for not insisting that the insurer pay the full
$10,000 policy limits in settlement of the case which, after trial, resulted in a ver-
dict of $250,000.47 The Lysick conflict is concisely articulated by Dondanville as
follows:
The court recognized that an attorney represents both the insurer and the insured.
Yet, if the attorney followed the court's admonition and urged the insurer to pay its
full policy limits, his advice would be clearly against the insurer's interest. The at-
torney juggled his representation of the insurer and the insured, and thus could not
adequately represent either. Unfortunately, Lysick fails to suggest a resolution to the
conflict arising from this dual representation. It merely states the repercussions of
an improper resolution.'
Lysick relied upon an earlier California case, Ivy v. Pacific Automobile Insur-
ance,49 which found insurance defense counsel chargeable with legal malpractice
for stipulating to a judgment in excess of the policy limits without the knowledge
40. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 251 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 355 N.E.2d 24 (I11.
1976)).
41. Triesch, supra note 5, at 215-16.
42. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 251 (citing Thornton v. Paul, 384 N.E.2d 335 (111. 978)).
43. Smyth, supra note 2, at 937; see also John G. Poust, Insurers' Tender to Insureds of Right to Choose Counsel
at Insurer's Expense. When Need This Be Done? 51 INs. CouNs. J. 563, 564 (1984); see cases collected at Triesch,
supra note 5, at 217-18 n.61.
44. 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
45. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 252.
46. Id.
47. Lysick, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
48. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 252.
49. 320 P.2d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
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and consent of the insured.50 The Lysick court noted that the essence of Ivy was
that the attorney's active conduct prejudicially affected the insured's substantive
rights and that this breach of his duties to the insured amounted to legal malprac-
tice. s"
D. Insured's Consent to Settlement
Another typical conflict arises from insurance policies which give the insured
the right to withhold his or her consent to settlement. If the settlement is attractive
to the insurer and economically feasible, it will be in the insurance company's in-
terest to accept it. However, the defendant, particularly in professional malprac-
tice, may consider settlement as a concession to the plaintiff in the form of an
admission of malpractice, and may want to withhold his or her consent.
Such was the case in Arana v. Koerner2 where, against the insured's instruc-
tions, the attorney proceeded with settlement in accordance with the insurer's
wishes. Doctor Arana's legal malpractice action against his defense attorney was
nonsuited in the trial court, but was reversed and remanded on appeal on the the-
ory that it stated a cause of action in legal malpractice against an attorney who
failed to abide by his client's instructions. s
Dondanville cites an even more complicated example involving a policy which
denied the right of consent to a former insured under a terminated policy.' In Rog-
ers v. Robson,"5 the insured, a physician who had been advised by his attorney that
he was not guilty of negligence and that his suit would be defended, instructed the
attorney not to settle the case. 56 Without notifying his doctor client that he was ne-
gotiating a settlement, the attorney, on instructions from the insurance company,
proceeded to settlement which paid the plaintiff a portion of his demand. Since
the physician "was entitled to a full disclosure of the intent to settle without his
consent, ... [t]he attorney was held liable for breaching his duty to the in-
sured. "58
These two cases are interesting authorities on the point of an attorney's duty to
give due deference to the insured's settlement instructions, regardless of the insur-
er's position, and regardless of the policy's provisions regarding consent. InArana
the contract expressly granted the right of consent to the insured, whereas in Rog-
ers the contract expressly denied him the right. As to the attorney's duty, the cases
came to the same conclusion: insurance defense counsel owes duties of disclosure
and due consideration of the insured's interests, regardless of the contractual rights
50. Id. at 148.
51. Lysick, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
52. 735 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
53. Id. at 737.
54. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 253 (citing Rogers v. Robson, 407 N.E.2d 47 (I11. 1980)).
55. Rogers v. Robson, 407 N.E.2d 47, 48 (111. 1980).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 253.
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which the policy may grant the insured on settlement. The duty of disclosure in
Rogers was predicated upon the duties owed by attorneys to their clients quite apart
from any contractual arrangement between the parties regarding settlement:
Defendants' duty to make such disclosure stemmed from their attorney-client rela-
tionship with plaintiff and was not affected by the extent of the insurer's authority to
settle without plaintiffs consent. 9
Insurance defense counsel who are sensitive to these conflicts can often see
them developing before they materialize and take preventative measures, such as
withdrawing or suggesting independent counsel to represent the insured's inter-
ests. However, the more troublesome conflicts are those that suddenly and unex-
pectedly spring into being some time after the attorney enters the picture:
The real problems arise, however, whenever counsel becomes aware of a conflict
during his investigation of the case. He is not permitted to divulge information re-
vealed by the insured to the insurer which, in the hands of the insurer, constitutes a
defense opposing the interests of the insured. Rather, counsel should strongly urge
the insured to obtain independent counsel. Even if the insured procures independent
counsel, it is unclear from the cases the extent to which, if at all, the attorney may
subsequently reveal the information he received from the insured to the insurer. Al-
most certainly, the attorney/client privilege prevents the attorney from revealing
anything he was told during the course of the relationship. The extent to which the




When the insurer sends the claims file to the attorney, any problems of coverage
are routinely brought to the attorney's attention. This includes coverage issues that
"may arise from claims for punitive damages for which the insurer is not liable,
allegations in the complaint that describe conduct specifically excluded from cov-
erage, or evidence that the insured failed to provide timely notice of the claim or
otherwise failed to 'cooperate' with the insurer. "61
It has been suggested that "an attorney should never research and advise the in-
surer on the merits of any coverage dispute, or participate in simultaneous or sub-
sequent litigation of such issues."62 By involving himself in a coverage dispute, the
attorney voluntarily enters an irreconcilable conflict of interests: "To do so would
be tantamount to advancing a position on behalf of the carrier that the attorney
would be bound to oppose on behalf of the insured. 63
59. Rogers, 407 N.E.2d at 49.
60. Dondanville, supra note 24, at 259.
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E Subrogation
Whether by contract, statute, or general equitable law, the insurer is ordinarily
entitled to be subrogated to any rights which the insured may have against another
who may have caused part or all of the loss .64
Where the carrier and the insured share a subrogation claim, a conflict of interest
may arise. This may occur where there is a deductible which the insured has not re-
covered or where the insured suffers uninsured losses in the incident(s) giving rise to
the claim. In such a case, defense counsel must be careful not to release the insured's
individual claims. This is best accomplished by early notification to both the insured
and the carrier of the prospective apportionment of the subrogation recovery and the
payment of attorney fees."6
IV. THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The problem of confidentiality in the tripartite situation usually involves infor-
mation about the insured which, if communicated to the insurer, would be detri-
mental to the insured and beneficial to the carrier.66 Often the information could
be used by the insurer to limit the policy's coverage, if not eliminate it altogether. 7
As every litigator knows, it is not uncommon in the investigation of any lawsuit to
discover private and confidential information which the client can rightfully ex-
pect to be kept inviolate. Even though the information may not create conflicting
interests between the two parties, it may still be subject to the attorney's ethical
duty under Model Rule 1.6.68 There is simply not enough litigation to ascertain
with precision the extent of a lawyer's civil liability in legal malpractice for sharing
such information with a co-defendant without the other's knowledge and approval.
But in the proverbial lovers' triangle of insurance defense, the attorney may owe
a duty of disclosure to his or her other client.69 Upon learning the confidential in-
formation, he or she is immediately faced with one of three difficult choices: "(1)
disclosure of all facts to the [i]nsurer, (2) withdrawal, or (3) continued representa-
tion of the [ilnsured without disclosure to the [ilnsurer. "70
Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires that the at-
torney hold confidential all "information relating to representation of a client," re-
gardless of whether it is privileged, a "secret," or otherwise the kind of
64. See 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1794 (1982); Sheldon Huriwitz, Conflicts and Other Problems of the At-
torney Engaged in the Practice of Property Insurance, 48 INS. CoUNs. J. 138, 139 (1981).
65. Triesch, supra note 5, at 219 (citations omitted).
66. See Daniel J. Ryan, Confidentiality, Disclosure and Discoverability in the Representation of Insurer and In-
sured, 48 INs. CouNs. J. 163 (1981).
67. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.5, at 368-70 (suggesting that the attorney's evaluation of the in-
sured's credibility for the insurer and personal concerns or disclosures of the insured which could prejudice cov-
erage "should be confidential from the other client").
68. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The rule covers all
"information relating to the representation of a client," -an exceedingly broad concept. Id.
69. Thomas A. Ford, The Insurance Contract: The Conflicts of Interest it Breeds, 36 INS. CouNs. J. 610, 620
(1969). The other client may be the insurer, co-defendants, or both.
70. Underwood, supra note 5, at 398.
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information that might not be considered confidential.71 This duty is broader than
that imposed by the former ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.72 In
addition to being an ethical obligation, the duty of confidentiality is an important
part of the attorney's duty of loyalty generated by the fiduciary nature of the attor-
ney-client relationship.73 Although the civil (fiduciary) duty may not be quite as
broad as Rule 1.6's ethical duty, it certainly precludes disclosure of confidential
information that would result in harm to the client.74
This duty of confidentiality is further complicated by certain long-standing evi-
dentiary rules applicable to the representation of co-defendants. It is commonly
assumed that the attorney-client privilege is waived as between joint parties repre-
sented by a single attorney, and the insurer and insured would certainly fit into that
general category.75 "Indeed, an early ABA Opinion held that the attorney should
disclose to the insurer all information received from the insured relating to cover-
age. 7 However, when the attorney discovers information that pits his two clients
against each other relative to the current representation, disclosure to the other
party can be ruinous to the disclosing client, and ultimately to the lawyer himself.77
It has been suggested that the solution is withdrawal from representation of both
parties:
The best way out is for [defense counsel] to withdraw from the case. The insured
loses nothing by his withdrawal because the attorney has been silenced by permit-
ting this confidential communication in the belief the attorney would treat it as con-
fidential. The company may be the loser, but since the attorney had not been
retained to ascertain coverage defenses or grounds of recission he has not breached
any duty to the insurer by nondisclosure. His immediate withdrawal subject to rea-
sonable notice of his intention to do so, seems to be the only appropriate course and,
as I see it, no insurance company could expect an attorney to pursue any other
course. 78
But as noted by Professor Underwood, the withdrawal must carry some expla-
nation, if nothing less than the vague mention of "a potential 'ethical problem'"
71. MODEL RULES, supra note 68.
72. Id. at (Model Code Comparison [I]).
73.2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 11.5, at 642-43.
74. Id. § 12.6, at 712-14.
75. 8 John Henry Wigmore, WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 23.12, at 604 (1981).
76. Underwood, supra note 5, at 398 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 822 (1965)).
77. Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976) (where an insurance defense counsel
communicated to the insurer information learned from the insured in confidence, thus enabling the insurer to
successfully deny coverage under the policy). Id. at 96. Focusing on the attorney's continued representation of
both clients after learning of the conflict raised by the confidential communication, the court held the insurer
liable in an amount doubLe the policy limits, noting that the attorney's conduct, in effect, canceled the insurer's
reservation of rights. Id. at 98-100. The court was visibly affected by the insurer's having declined an offer to
settle within the policy limits, believing (on the strength of the improperly revealed confidences of the insured)
that there was no coverage. Id. at 99.
But for the attorney's breach of confidence, the case most likely would have been settled. Id. at 100. Did the
attorney commit actionable legal malpractice?
78. Underwood, supra note 5 at 398-99 (quotation omitted).
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which, itself, may be a tip-off regarding the insured's position.79 He suggests that
the better course of action is continued representation without disclosure to the in-
surer:
Since withdrawal may prejudice the insured, and since counsel owes no duty to the
insurer to ascertain or otherwise develop evidence pertinent to coverage, the best
course of action in our hypothetical is for Attorney to represent the insured without
disclosure of the insured's confidences.80
Professor Underwood also cites the Guiding Principles of The National Confer-
ence of Lawyers and Liability Insurers81 as authority for keeping confidential the
communication from the insurer,82 but noting that the Guiding Principles would
apply different rules if the information came to the attorney from some source
other than the client.8"
V. SIMULTANEOUS DEFENSE OF MULTIPLE CO-DEFENDANTS
It is not uncommon for the same company to insure more than one of the parties
named as defendants in a professional malpractice action, particularly in medical
malpractice. When multiple insureds of the same insurance company become co-
defendants represented by a single law firm, the simple triangle becomes a more
complex pyramid or even a multi-sided polygon. In such situations it may be ar-
gued that there is an ipsofacto conflict for the attorney which requires the appoint-
ment of independent counsel for each of the claims and, perhaps, defendants,' but
it has been maintained that a conflict of interest is not a foregone conclusion.
85
Certainly if the insureds have claims against each other, or if one of the in-
sureds has a defense which may, or in fact does adversely affect the interests of an-
other insured, their interests are in conflict.86 Obviously, it is the lawyer's
responsibility to be on the alert for these actual or potential conflicts from the very
79. Id. at 399.
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also 20 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q., Summer 1970, at 95 (where the Guiding Principles are compiled).
82. See the Guiding Principles, p. VI in 20 FED'N INS. CouNs. Q., Summer 1970, at 95.
83. Id. at IV-V.
84. Smyth, supra note 2, at 940. Certainly if the interests of the co-defendants do not coincide, the insurer
should provide separate counsel for each. First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648 (Haw. 1983); see also Yeomans v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 324 A.2d 906 (N.J. 1974).
85. Triesch, supra note 5, at 216 (noting that the dual representation is permissible only with "the infbrmed
consent of each insured and even then only if competent representation of each interest is still possible") (citing
Hamilton v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 1020 (Wash. 1973), affd, 523 P.2d 193 (Wash. 1974) and
Van Dyke v. White, 349 P.2d 430 (Wash. 1960)); see also S. R. Shapiro, Annotation, Liability Insurer's Rights
and Duties as to Defense and Settlement as Affected by t's Having Issued Policies Covering Parties Who Have Con-
flicting Interests, 18 A.L.R.3D § 3, at 482 (1968) (citing Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 194 N.E.2d 489 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1963)).
86. Triesch, supra note 5, at 216. The problem is discussed from two perspectives in Harold T. Boone, The
Representation of Multiple But Adverse Insureds; The Insurance Company's Perspective, 48 INs. COUNS. J. 134
(1981), and Darrell L. Havener, The Representation ofMultiple Insured's -Defense Counsel's Perspective, 48 INs.
COUNS. J. 136 (1981).
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outset, and to take appropriate and timely preventative or curative measures .87 In
some instances, adequate disclosure of all the facts with the informed consent of
all interested parties is sufficient.88 Of course, if the conflict is obvious from the
beginning or surfaces full blown at a later time, the attorney's responsibility may
be to either withdraw, recommend independent counsel, or both.89
Informal Opinion 1476, issued by the American Bar Association in 1981, ad-
dressed the duty of a lawyer to preserve confidences in the representation of multi-
ple co-parties. There, the lawyer retained by the insurer to represent an insured
employer and its employee learned in the course of that representation that the em-
ployee's conduct may have been outside the policy's coverage1 In response to the
lawyer's request for advice regarding his professional responsibility to disclose to
the insurance company or the employer the information gained from the employee
in preparing the defense, the Committee ruled that "the lawyer should not reveal to
the insurance company the information gained by the lawyer from either the em-
ployee or the witness [who corroborated the employee's statement], when the rev-
elation might result in denial of insurance protection to the employee."92 The
Committee noted that the employee made no false or fraudulent statements and
had not refused to cooperate with the insurance company. 3
Another complication presented by simultaneous representation of multiple in-
sureds involves the insurer's duty to make a timely disclaimer of liability with re-
spect to any of the insureds whose conduct may have taken them outside the
policy's coverage. Failure to act in a timely manner may thereafter render the in-
surer liable for acts not otherwise within the policy's coverage. 4 This would ordi-
narily be a problem only for the insurer, but, because of the awkward nature of the
87. Commenting on the responsibilities of insurance defense counsel representing multiple co-defendants,
Underwood notes:
The attorney has an obligation to make sure that both insureds are fully aware of the perils of simultane-
ous representation prior to any joint consultation, and take care that the confidences and secrets of one
client are not furnished to the other. Such potential conflicts probably will occur in all cases in which an
attorney is retained to represent multiple insureds. It would be wise, therefore, for the attorney to reject
such employment as a general rule, and thereby avoid the consequences of a belated withdrawal or future
litigation.
Underwood, supra note 5, at 395.
88. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit an attorney to continue representation with the informed
consent of the client in two situations: (1) representation that is "directly adverse to another client," and (2) repre-
sentation that may "be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or
by a lawyer's own interests .... MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.7(a), (b) (1983). Subsec-
tion (b)(2) requires consultation with all clients when multiple clients are involved, including "explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved." Id. at Rule 1.7(b)(2).
89. Triesch, supra note 5, at 216.




94. Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y of Maryland v. Miller, 451 A.2d 930 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982). In Miller,
one of the defendant physicians had admitted to the claims manager his failure to obtain informed consent. Id.
After a delay of 18 months, the insurer notified the defendant that it was withdrawing coverage. Id. at 931-32.
For its failure to disclaim within a reasonable time after learning of the facts, the insurer was ordered to extend
full coverage because the physician was found to have been prejudiced by the intervening dual representation. Id.
at 934.
[Vol. 12:73
1991] WHEN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BECOMES LEGAL MALPRACTICE 87
defense counsel's dual representation, he should be sensitive to the impact which
the carrier's failure may have on his other clients who may be hurt thereby."s
VI. WHO SELECTS AND PAYS FOR INDEPENDENT COUNSEL?
Insurance defense counsel has the responsibility of recognizing a situation that
calls for independent counsel for either or both of his clients and to recommend
appropriate action:
If there is any objective reason for the insured to have additional legal counseling,
defense counsel should promptly advise him to go and seek it. Any doubt on this
question should be resolved in favor of recommending independent advice. See:
Comment, Rule 1.7, MRPC. The prudent attorney, recognizing that the unsophisti-
cated insured has a more acute need for independent counsel than the carrier, will
want him to have it.
96
Depending upon the provisions of the policy and the circumstances of the litiga-
tion, the insurer may be required to pay a portion or all of the expenses of indepen-
dent counsel. 97 The issue arises most often when the complaint filed against the
insured contains multiple allegations, only some of which are covered by the pol-
icy, or when plaintiff seeks damages in excess of the policy limits. Another in-
stance common to professional malpractice litigation involves multiple
co-defendants whose respective interests are not identical. Although the authori-
ties are divided on the issue of whether the insurer is obliged to supply independent
counsel for the insured under such circumstances, the overwhelming majority au-
thorize the insured to select independent counsel at the insurer's expense when a
conflict between them arises on the issues of defense." The general rule has been
articulated as follows:
Normally, an insurer's duty to defend is coupled with the right to control the defense
of the litigation . . . . The purpose of such right is to allow insurers to protect their
financial interest in the outcome of litigation and to minimize unwarranted liability
claims. Giving the insurer exclusive control over litigation against the insured safe-
guards the orderly and the proper disbursement of the large sums of money involved
in the business ....
However, in situations where conflict of interest and loyalties are apparent, "[t]he
insurer's desire to control the defense must yield to its obligations to defend the in-
95. E.g., when there is a risk of exposure in excess of the policy's limits, the insurer's mistake may cause the
non-tainted insureds damages which their lawyer could have avoided by assuring a timely disclaimer by the in-
surer to the detriment of another client.
96. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 273 (Miss. 1988). Hartford involved a suit by
an insured against the insurer and defense counsel, neither of whom had informed the insured of an offer to settle
within the policy limits to which the insurer made a counter offer. Id. at 257. Holding that the insured was not
harmed by the failure of the insurer and defense counsel to notify of the offer and counter offer, the court reversed
a judgment in favor of the insured and rendered judgment for the insurer and defense counsel directly on the ap-
peal concluding that "the Circuit Court erred in refusing the defense motions to direct a verdict in favor of the
defendants . . . . "Id. at 275-76.
97. Smyth, supra note 2, at 941; see also Paul W. Fager, Insured's Right To Independent Counsel In Conflicts Of
Interest Situations, 48 INs. CouNs. J. 160 (1981).
98. Smyth, supra note 2, §§ 9-12, at 955-59.
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sured .... "In such cases, the insured has the right to obtain counsel of its own
choice to be paid by the insurance company .... 99
If animosity occurs between the insured and the insurer of sufficient magnitude
to rise to a conflict of interests, there is authority requiring the retention of inde-
pendent counsel for the insured at the insurer's expense.1"0 The same may be true
when the insurer either fails to settle a case, or settles without the insured's con-
sent.'
Although there may not be a direct conflict of interest when the insurer does not
have sufficient economic interest to assure a vigorous defense, it has been noted
that in "actions in which the insurer lacks an economic motive for a vigorous de-
fense of the insured, or in which the insurer and the insured have conflicting inter-
ests, the insurer may not compel the insured to surrender control of the
litigation."'0 2 Certainly, where the litigation is complex, the insurer's exposure is
relatively minimal, and the insured's potential liability is substantial, the lack of
economic interest test may mandate independent counsel.103
When independent counsel is mandated by the law, "[m]ost courts appear to al-
low the insured to select independent counsel when a conflict of interest arises
[but] . .. [s]everal jurisdictions have allowed an insurer to retain the right of rea-
sonable participation in the selection of independent counsel .... "104 If the pol-
icy or circumstances do not exonerate the insurer from the costs of independent
counsel, it is not uncommon for those costs to be placed entirely upon the insurer
99. Parker v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (1981) (citations omitted).
100. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730(7th Cir. 1976) (applying California law).
101. Smyth, supra note 2, § 7, at 9 5 3 -54.
102. Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 394 P.2d 571, 577 (Cal. 1964) (citations omitted). See also Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing Tomerlin). It appears that identify-
ing what constitutes a lack of sufficient economic interest must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
103. Parker v. Agri. Ins. Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1981), involved seven lawsuits seeking $26,000,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $169,000,000 in punitive damages, with the primary insurer's liability limited to
$1,000,000. All of the parties agreed that the primary insurer had the burden of defending the lawsuits, but the
primary and secondary insurers disclaimed liability for any punitive damages. Finding that the insured was enti-
tled to choose between counsel and control all of the litigation, the court based its conclusion upon the following:
(1) the punitive damages greatly exceeded the compensatory damages, (2) the existence of multiple lawsuits, and
(3) the fact that the primary insurer's duty to defend would stop once its relatively small primary coverage limit
was exhausted. The court also based its ruling upon the general principle that "the duty to defend is broader than
the duty to pay." Id. at 968.
104. Smyth, supra note 2, §§ 9, 11, at 938; see also Center Found. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19
(Ct. App. 1991) (where insureds sued the insurer for breach of contract after the insurer refused to approve inde-
pendent counsel chosen by the insureds to defend following a reservation of rights to contest coverage). The court
held that, as a matter of law, the insurer did not breach its obligations to the insureds by asserting its right to
approve independent counsel, so long as the insurer's position was not unreasonable. Id.
Although a contractual provision giving the insurer the authority to select, or to consent to, the selection of
independent counsel is not necessarily violative of public policy, New York State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL
Corp., 738 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984), there is authority permitting the insured to make the selection, Parker v.
Agricultural Ins. Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1981); Boyd Bros. Transp. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 729 F2d
1407 (11 th Cir. 1984), as well as the insurer, First Ins. Co. v. State, 665 P.2d 648 (Haw. 1983)). Some cases
have permitted the selection by either party, Howard v. Russell Stover Candies, 649 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981),
while others have permitted the insured to select independent counsel, followed by reimbursment from the in-
surer, Bituminous Ins. Co. v. Penn Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp 539 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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when they are not readily apportionable.' Since professional liability insurance
provides coverage for both defense and liability for loss, the issue of competent in-
dependent defense counsel is a matter of primary importance to the insured. In-
deed, the insurer's duty to defend the insured has been held to be broader than the
very broad duty placed upon the insurer to pay on behalf of its insured. '06 If it de-
velops that the attorney's ties to the insurer are strong enough to create a conflict of
interests, the insured may be entitled to assume control of his own defense at the
insurer's expense.
10 7
When all the insureds are partners, one or more of whom is suing the others,
each defendant may be entitled to select his or her own counsel at the cost of the
insurer.108 Thus, if a physician is sued by his partners, public policy may demand
that he be given the right to choose his own counsel when the insurer is in a posi-
tion of conflict of interest regarding the litigation. 0 9
However, it has been held that the insurer's retention of separate, independent
counsel for multiple co-defendants whose positions were antagonistic was in keep-
ing with the terms of the insurance policy and satisfied the insurer's obligation." 0
Thus, when law partners are all named as defendants in a legal malpractice action
and one of the partners is asserting affirmative claims against the others, he may
not be entitled to reimbursment for independent counsel fees incurred by him
when, pursuant to the contract, the insurer has selected another person as indepen-
dent counsel. " There was no breach of the attorney-client privilege for the in-
surer-selected independent counsel to periodically report to the insurer because he
was working for both the insurer and the insured.1 2
VII. SETTLEMENT
The potential for legal malpractice in settlement is as real and present as it is in
the investigation and litigation of professional malpractice claims. "Perhaps the
most obvious and most common conflict of interest situation encountered in the
insurance defense practice concerns settlements."113 Although all parties want the
matter resolved with no payment and no admission of liability, the interests of the
insurer and the insured tend to diverge if that desire is not realized. Often the pro-
105. Smyth, supra note 2, § 7, at 953-54.
106. Gibraltar Casualty Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 574 N.E.2d 664 (i11. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 580
N.E.2d 113 (111. 1991); Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Co., 479 N.E.2d 988,991 (111. App. Ct. 1985).
107. Nandorf 479 N.E.2d at 991 (where the court found that a defense under a reservation of rights created a
conflict of interests since the insurer had refused to relinquish control of the defense, reserving its rights because
of a potential punitive damages award. It was held to be against public policy for one party to control both sides of
the litigation).
108. Joseph v. Markovitz, 551 P.2d 571, 576-77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
109. Id. at 576.
110. Goldberg v. American Home Assurance Co., 439 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. Div. 1981).
111. Id. This problem is addressed in the Guiding Principles, 20 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q., Summer 1970, at 95,
Part VII "Counter Claims."
112. Goldberg, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
113. Robert E. Leake, Jr., The Role Of Defense Counsel Regarding Settlement Denands And Opportunities, 48
INs. COuNS. J. 169 (1981) [hereinafter Leake].
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fessional who is sued for malpractice considers the very existence of the dispute as
an unfounded and wrongful smirch on his or her professional ability or integrity,
taking great personal umbrage at the plaintiff's claims. Under such circumstances,
the defendant may not want to give anything to the plaintiff, often believing that
even a token payment in settlement would be, if not immoral, an intolerable admis-
sion against interest.
By contrast, the insurer's interest is more economic in nature and, like most le-
gitimate business questions, focuses on net costs.' 14 These costs are not always de-
nominated in dollars and cents, but may ultimately find their roots in other very
real and pressing market factors. 1 ' When the plaintiffs demand does not legiti-
mately justify the costs of the defense, or if the risks of loss place heavy incentives
on the insurer to settle without trial, the defense counsel's two clients may not view
a proposed settlement in the same light.
Additional divergence between the clients may exist at the dollar limits con-
tained in the policy. Whereas the insured wants the damages to stay within the pol-
icy limits at all costs, once they cross that line, the excess becomes the exclusive
concern of the insured, the insurer having reached its maximum exposure. 16
These factors can be exacerbated by the policy provisions regarding the allocation
or non-allocation of the costs of defense to the policy's limits.117
Yet another area of potential conflict at the settlement stage is the lawyer's per-
sonal interest. The pugilistic juices that flow in all good trial lawyers sometimes
cloud their personal desires regarding going to trial, and can overflow into their
professional judgment on the matter. 118 Furthermore, because most defense coun-
sel are paid by the hour, there is the natural potential for the lawyer's personal in-
terest to intrude into the settlement process: the fees for litigating, and perhaps
114. One judge considered the insurer-insured relationship as resting upon a "hardboiled commercial transac-
tion." Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F. Supp. 865, 872 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
115. For-profit insurers have their shareholders or other owners to contend with. All insurers have an interest
in keeping premiums at reasonable levels, and must satisfy state laws regarding financial solidarity, reserves, etc.
An important non-economic consideration for the insurer is the avoidance of the reputation of being "an easy
mark" for plaintiffs' lawyers who might be interested in nuisance-value settlements. No insurer wants the reputa-
tion of a "pushover" who will not defend even outrageous claims.
116. Mr. Robert Leake has observed:
Defense counsel is in the middle. As the company-employed attorney fbr the insured, and for the com-
pany as well, defense counsel must serve both clients faithfully, placing neither's interest above that of the
other, and clearly informing both of their respective positions and the risks of litigation. The only course
of action available to counsel is to evaluate the claims made by adverse parties as if there were no insur-
ance limit involved-either no insurance policy, or an unlimited one. This is not to say that counsel
should not be aware of the policy limit, for indeed he should.
Leake, supra note 113, at 169-70.
117. When defense costs are applied toward the policy limits, the insured is actually paying part of defense
counsel's fees when settlement or judgment exceeds the limits. That fact alters the dynamics of counsel's relation-
ship with the insured, whose interest in the lawyer's billable hours can become increasingly personal.
118. See Smiley v. Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co., 375 N.E.2d 118 (111. 978), where judgment against de-
fense counsel on the behalf of the insurer was entered in legal malpractice. Defendant had been retained by the
insurer to defend a claim covered under a policy and had been given authority to settle within the $20,000 limits.
Id. at 119. Instead of accepting an offer of settlement for $17,000, he unilaterally decided to go to trial and suf-
fered a $55,000judgment against his defendant. Id. at 120. In a suit against the insurer for the excess, the defense
attorney was named as a third party defendant and was found to be negligent as a matter of law. Id. at 124.
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appealing the issues framed in the petition.119 Of course, this potential is not
unique to insurance defense counsel because hosts of other lawyers bill their cli-
ents on an hourly basis, and are therefore subject to the same suspicion, if not real-
ity.
A. Contractual Provisions Regarding Insured's Consent
The provisions of the policy usually address the issue of settlement, by either
(1) leaving it entirely up to the insurer if it is within the policy limits, (2) requiring
the consent of the insured, regardless of the amount, 2 ' or (3) some combination
involving these and other elements.121 Policies which require the insured's consent
to settlement are bargained-for, and presumably costlier.122 Even if the policy au-
thorizes the insurer to settle within the policy limits and without the insured's con-
currence, that authority may not be exercised arbitrarily.123 There may still be a
duty to investigate the claim, give due consideration to the desires or instructions
of the insured, and avoid settling the claim in bad faith, even though the policy
gives the insured no rights regarding settlement within its limits."4
This contractual provision may alter the firmly entrenched legal maxim that an
attorney cannot settle a matter without his or her client's consent. Thus, if the cli-
ent has contracted away his right to control the settlement of a lawsuit covered by
the policy, he may not win a legal malpractice action against his insurance defense
counsel who, following the provisions of the policy and the direction of the in-
surer, settles without the defendant's consent.'25 However, as noted in the follow-
ing section, the lawyer's duty to keep the client informed may not be excused by
such contractual provisions.
119. The perceived bias of insurance defense counsel is "tied to [his or her] assumed financial and personal
relationships with the insurer." Ronald E. Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 53 INS.
COuNS. J. 108 (1986).
120.2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.21, at 432-36.
121. DEFENDING THE PROFESSIONAL, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE SERIES, P.L.I. No. C4-4159
(1982), § 8V at 371-72.
122. 7C JOHN A. APLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4711, at 55 (Supp. 1988); see also Jason A.
Reschly, Recent Cases, Attorney Malpractice - Wrongful Settlement by the Insured's and Insurer's Joint Defense At-
torney, 45 Mo. L. Rnv. 739, 745 n.37 (1980) [hereinafter Reschly], where it is stated:
The proposition that insurance companies may settle without the insured's consent, assuming the policy
grants such a power, has been widely recognized by the courts. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hitchner, 61
N.J. Super. 283, 286, 160 A.2d 521, 522 (Law Div. 1960) (insured liable to insurer even though insurer
settled against insured's wishes); Wood Truck Leasing, Inc. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d
223, 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (court upheld insurer's right to settle without consent in the absence of
fraud or bad faith, even though it caused the insured to pay higher premiums). But see Employers' Surplus
Line Ins. Co. v. City of Baton Rouge, 362 So. 2d 561,564-65 (La. 1978) (majority failed to hold insured
liable since the insured failed to consent; dissent pointed out the inconsistency of the majority in giving
the insurer the duty to settle and to refuse to settle). The right of the insurer to settle any claim is statutorily
recognized in Illinois by I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 95 1/2 § 7-317(f)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1971).
Reschly, supra, at 745 n.37.
123. Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194 (Ala. 1988).
124. Id.; see also Parsons, 550 P.2d at 94.
125. Mitchum, 533 So. 2d at 197-98.
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B. The Duty to Notify the Insured
Insurance defense counsel is in a very awkward posture when he or she is in-
structed by the insurer to settle within the policy limits under a policy which grants
the insured no right to withhold consent to the settlement, but when the very act of
settlement may cause irreparable injury to the insured's reputation. These issues
were, in part, litigated in Feliberty v. Damon126 where a physician sued both his
attorney and insurer for wrongfully settling a medical malpractice case within the
policy limits.7 The physician claimed that the publicity in the case "had de-
stroyed his practice and ultimately forced him to leave the area." '28
The court held that the insurer's settlement of the case without notice to the in-
sured was not made in bad faith and that the insurer could not be held vicariously
responsible for any alleged legal malpractice of the defense attorney selected by
the insurer. 29 Since the appeal involved only the insurer's motion for summary
judgment, the issue of defense counsel's duties to the insured under such circum-
stances was not addressed.
Where the policy gives the insured the right to withhold his or her consent to a
settlement, defense counsel may be liable in legal malpractice for failure to abide
by the insured's attempt to overrule the insurer's instructions to settle. 130 In Arana,
the appellate court reversed and remanded the dismissal of an insured's claim for
punitive damages against his insurance defense attorneys. 131 The court granted the
physician an opportunity to offer evidence to support his allegations that the de-
fendants were more than negligent when they knowingly settled the medical mal-
practice action without his knowledge or consent under circumstances highly
likely to result in injury to the physician's reputation.' 32 Missouri law permits pu-
nitive damages in negligence cases where the defendant's conduct "manifests a
reckless indifference or conscious disregard for the rights of others." 33
An interesting allegation in Dr. Arana's legal malpractice suit against his
former insurance defense counsel raises an aspect of the tripartite relationship
which is almost always available to the insured: the lawyer's personal interest in his
or her business relationship with the insurer.1 34 Noting that the petition alleged
that the former defense counsel "knowingly settled in order to favor their business
relationship with Medical Protective [the insurer] over their duty to plaintiff[,]"
135
the court found that the petition sufficiently alleged that the defendants knew or
had reason to know that their settlement of the medical malpractice action "with-
126. 527 N.E.2d 261 (N.Y. 1988).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 262.
129.Id. at 262-63.
130. Arana, 735 S.W.2d at 729.
131. Id. at 736.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 736 (citing Sharp v. Robberson, 495 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. 1973) (en banc)).
134. Id. at 732.
135. Id. at 736.
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out Arana's consent or knowledge was highly likely to result in injury to Arana's
reputation."136 Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the petition, the court of ap-
peals sent it back for trial, including trial on the issue of punitive damages.137
Notwithstanding the provisions of the insurance contract to the contrary, the at-
torney-client relationship may require that insurance defense counsel inform the
insured of a proposed settlement, proceeding with utmost caution if the insured
objects. If the clients are in disagreement regarding the settlement of the case,
their common attorney is in a position of conflict, regardless of their respective
contractual rights vis a vis each other.138
Although the defendant physician in Rogers had no contractual right to consent
to settlement, he repeatedly informed his attorney of his opposition to settlement,
and was assured that the suit would be defended.3 9 Thereafter, on instructions
from the insurer, counsel settled the suit for $1,250."1 The court that heard the
insured's legal malpractice suit against his former defense counsel held that,
"when defendants became aware that a settlement was imminent and that plaintiff
did not wish the case settled, a conflict arose which prevented their continuing to
represent both plaintiff and the insurer without a full and frank disclosure of the
circumstances."' 4' The duty of disclosure arose from the attorney-client relation-
ship and was not affected by the policy's grant of authority to the insurer to settle
without the consent of the insured.' 42 For failure to obtain the insured's informed
consent to settlement, the insurance defense attorneys were subject to liability to
the insured in legal malpractice."
Of course, when the proposed settlement is in excess of the policy limits, the
dynamics introduce new complexities for defense counsel. The attorney has an af-
firmative duty to notify the insured of the potential exposure to his personal assets
and the propriety of considering independent counsel.'" It has been held that un-
136. Id. at 737.
137. Id.
138. Rogers, 407 N.E.2d at 48.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 48.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 49.
143. Id. But see Mary C. Sweeney, Comments Concerning Problems Relating to Conflicts of Interests, 26 TmIAL
LAW. GUIDE 424 (1982) [hereinafter Sweeney], where she notes:
We have been asked by some defense attorneys to research the question whether they have a duty to dis-
close and discuss settlement offers with their insured clients. They do, according to Joos v. Auto-Owners
Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. App. 1980). However, the fact that such disclosure was not made does
not necessarily subject a defense attorney to liability. See, e.g., Rubenstein & Rubenstein v. Papadakos,
31 App. Div. 615, 295 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1968) (memorandum opinion).
Sweeney, supra, at 426. The court inJoos held that expert testimony was not required to show that the attorney
acted below the standard of care in failing to inform both his clients of offers to settle prior to and during the trial.
Joos, 288 N.W.2d at 445.
144. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988), where the court stated:
First, when [defense counsel] were employed it was their responsibility to be sure that [insured] was noti-
fied he was being sued in excess of his policy limits, clearly signal to him his personal liability danger, and
that he should consider employing his own attorney if he cared to do so.
Id. at 273 (citations omitted).
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der such circumstances the insurer is obliged to provide independent counsel for
the insured by reason of the conflict of interests which the proposed settlement
generates.
C. Fraud or Misrepresentation
in Settlement Negotiations
If insurance defense counsel commits fraud or makes a material misrepresenta-
tion of fact, he or she may be liable to the party or parties injured by such conduct.
Ordinarily the misrepresentation will tend to be injurious to the plaintiff in the
original action which gave rise to the insurance defense. For example, in Slotkin v.
Citizen's Casualty Co. of New York, 146 insurance defense counsel in a medical mal-
practice case was found to have deliberately misrepresented the limits of insurance
coverage at $200,000 when in point of fact there was excess coverage of one mil-
lion dollars. 147 Finding that, but for the misrepresentation, the case would have
been settled for $680,000 instead of the actual figure of $185,000, the jury appor-
tioned $20,000 of its judgment against insurance defense counsel, $100,000
against the attorney for the defendant hospital, and the balance against the insurer
and its vice-president." The court noted that the insurance defense counsel's con-




Professors Mallen and Smith have suggested that to avoid unnecessary exposure
to being sued by a disappointed insured, insurance defense counsel should take the
following precautions when negotiating a settlement:
(1) Assure regular and complete disclosures to the insured "of all facts, circum-
stances and consequences which are necessary to enable the insured to make an in-
formed decision," 50
(2) Notify the insured promptly of any settlement negotiations,
(3) Do not disregard the insured's directions against settlement, regardless of
whether the policy grants consent authority to the insured, and
(4) Be sure that the insurer fulfills its good faith obligations to the insured.151
Four more warnings may be added:
(5) Maintain strict neutrality when representing both the insured and insurer in ne-
145. Smyth, supra note 2, at 954 (citing Hamilton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 1020 (Wash.
1973), affd, 523 P.2d 193 (Wash. 1974)).
146. 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 981 (1980).
147. Id. at 305.
148. Id. at 310.
149. Id. at 314.
150. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 23.21, at 435.
151. Id. at 4 32-35.
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gotiations to settle within the policy limits when the risks of excess exposure are sig-
nificant,
152
(6) Keep alert for indirect or concomitant adverse consequences of an otherwise
seemingly beneficial settlement,
15 3
(7) Guard against the advocate's natural zeal for the best possible settlement creating
an exposure to liability for fraud or misrepresentation,1 5 ' and
(8) Don't advise your client to lie at depositions!
1 5
1
152. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 268 (Miss. 1988).
153. E.g., Ivy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 320 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1958) (no direct monetary damage to the insured,
but indirect damage through impaired credit rating); Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 419 A.2d 417
(N.J. 1980) (150% interest premium charged on insured); Aquiliana v. O'Connor, 59 A.2d 454 (N.Y. App. Div.
1977) (prejudicing insured's right to a malicious prosecution claim).
154. Slotkin, 614 F2d at 301.
155. See Blain v. The Doctor's Co., 272 Cal. Rptr. 250, 252 (Ct. App. 1990), where Dr. Blain sued his former
insurance defense counsel in legal malpractice alleging injuries of emotional distress and loss of ability to practice
medicine resulting from lies he allegedly told in his deposition at the advice of his attorneys. Rejecting the emo-
tionally distraught plaintiff, the court held that the equitable doctrine of unclean hands barred his claim:
The complaint is founded upon the claim that insurance defense counsel advised Blain, the insured, to lie
at his deposition in the medical malpractice action, which advice Blain followed. This resulted in the fil-
ing of an amended complaint against Blain seeking punitive damages. That action was later settled. The
insurance company, The Doctor's Company (Doctor's), paid the policy limits and Blain paid nothing.
Blain contends that in these circumstances he has stated a cause of action on the theory that defense coun-
sel's improper strategy exposed him to greater liability, caused him emotional distress, and precluded his
further work as a physician.
We will affirm the judgment [granting general demurrers].
Id. at 251.

